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Bonuses serve as a valuable tool in attracting and retaining Naval officers.  
This thesis analyzes the way officer bonuses are currently distributed in the Navy 
and provides recommended changes based on analysis of scholarly publications.  
Combining the information gained from current policies and research already 
conducted in the academic arena, the author proposes a workable bonus 
structure to meet recruitment and retention goals while providing the Navy 
flexibility, quality personnel, and cost effectiveness.  Combining auction theory 
and signaling theory into a new program has great potential to provide flexibility 
to the Navy, maintain the appropriate quantity and quality of officers, and provide 
cost savings to the Navy, while providing continued servicemember satisfaction.  
By offering bonus programs of different rates and time commitments, 
effectiveness and personnel quality can be increased by allowing officers to 
signal their intentions to the Navy.  Auctions can be used to determine the 
appropriate monetary values to offer under each contract.  By implementing an 
auction for bonus amounts, the Navy helps to ensure that bonuses will be 
competitive with the overall job market.  This approach provides the Navy with a 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES  
While the actions of the United States military depend heavily on 
technology, weaponry, and infrastructure, the fundamental element of a 
successful military is a complete and competent array of personnel.  Though the 
required number of personnel and their required skills change over time, the 
necessity of the military to attract and retain servicemembers is unchanging.  As 
a result, attention must be paid to personnel policies in an attempt to maximize 
program effectiveness. 
Continual spending increases by the Department of Defense on costs 
associated with personnel provide another impetus to review the personnel pay 
structure.  While bonuses account for a small fraction of Military Personnel Navy 
(MPN) spending, it is an area worthy of being addressed because of the large 
impact it can have on military members’ individual choices.  As a result, it can 
lead to changes in behavior that impact other costs, such as training, education, 
or recruitment, when valuable servicemembers opt not to continue their military 
careers. 
Bonuses serve as valuable tools in attracting and retaining Naval officers.  
However, they are not always cost effective.  Naval aviators can be used as an 
example.  Naval aviators receive bonuses and special pays that are described in 
detail in Chapter III.  During times when commercial pilots are in high demand, 
increasing competition in the job market for existing pilots, the Navy’s aviation 
bonus and special pays can be seen as effective because of the significant costs 
required for the Navy to recruit and train new pilots to replace those who leave 
for the private sector.  On the other hand, when commercial pilots are not in high 
demand due to other market forces, the bonuses and special pays that aviators 
receive can be seen as ineffective since the Navy could have likely retained the 




The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the way officer bonuses are 
currently distributed in the Navy and provide recommended changes based on 
analysis of scholarly publications.  The Navy’s approach will be contrasted with 
other compensation schemes and theoretical applications.  Applying these 
principles will result in a new bonus structure allowing the Navy to realize cost 
savings while attracting and retaining the proper number of qualified officers. 
 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The question of how to structure Naval Officer bonus programs, and 
compensation as a whole, is one that has been continually revisited since the All 
Volunteer Force (AVF) began in 1973.  Deservedly so, because effective 
employers must constantly review and assess their incentive structure to ensure 
that it remains relevant and efficient as labor market forces change.  This 
research aims to address both structural and effectiveness issues. 
   
1. Primary Question 
How might the bonus structure for Naval Officers be changed to meet 
recruitment and retention goals, with qualified personnel, while providing the 
Department of the Navy with flexibility and cost effectiveness as the military and 
civilian labor markets change? 
 
2. Secondary Questions 
In order to fully address the primary questions, several secondary 
questions will have to be answered in the development of this thesis.  These 
questions include the benefits and weaknesses of the current system; potential 
improvements through the use of existing auction and job market signaling 
analysis; the feasibility of incorporating these concepts into a workable Naval 






C. THESIS SCOPE 
This thesis focuses on the Unrestricted Line (URL) Officer population of 
the United States Navy.  United States Marine Corps policies are not addressed, 
as USMC policies have been largely successful and do not necessarily compare 
with those of the Navy.  Historically, Marines have enacted their own policies for 
recruitment and retention and will continue to do so in the future based on their 
own unique situation.  To understand the background of Navy bonuses, research 
was conducted into the various bonus programs employed by the Navy today.  
To gain insight into other means of attracting and retaining employees, various 
academic sources were consulted and are incorporated into the thesis.  While 
the analysis will specifically address the Navy’s URL Officer population, aspects 
of the recommendations can be incorporated into the various other services as 
appropriate. 
   
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis consisted of a literature review and 
combining appropriate elements of the literature into a cohesive bonus structure 
that might provide the Navy with improved cost effectiveness.  Military 
compensation policies were reviewed to provide clarity as to where the Navy is 
today.  Academic literature was then reviewed to address the application of 
auction theory and signaling theory to the job market in which the Navy directly 
competes. 
Combining the information gained from the goal of current policy and the 
research already conducted in the academic arena, the author proposes a 
workable bonus structure to meet the recruitment and retention goals while 






E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This document is arranged in six chapters to provide a logical and 
descriptive approach to the recommendations regarding the Navy Officer Bonus 
program. 
Chapter I provides a general overview of the paper, including the 
objectives of the thesis, and addresses the questions to be answered.  Next the 
scope of the topic is discussed along with the methodology used in reaching the 
conclusions contained in the text. 
Chapter II outlines the current compensation structure in today’s military.  
The various monetary and non-monetary forms of compensation are briefly 
discussed, along with an analysis of some issues that arise from the continued 
use of the military compensation system. 
Chapter III gives a detailed account of current bonus programs in use by 
the United States Navy for Unrestricted Line Officers.  The chapter is broken 
down into communities: Aviation Warfare, Submarine Warfare, and Surface 
Warfare. 
Chapter IV provides the reader with an overview of Auctions and 
illustrates the various terms used in the discussion of auction theory.  
Furthermore, the different types of auctions are described.  The chapter 
concludes with a summary of where auctions are used in practice and their 
applicability and appropriateness to the Navy Officer Bonus program. 
Chapter V covers Signaling Theory, providing the reader with a 
background on how Signaling theory is used in the market today along with ideas 
about it’s applicability to the Navy. 
Chapter VI is the final chapter, outlining how Auction Theory and Signaling 
Theory can be combined to provide the Navy cost effectiveness in the area of 
Officer Bonus Programs.  Recommendations are provided along with the 





term.  Areas of further research are also discussed, where additional study could 
yield increased savings and efficiency with proper application to the Navy Officer 




























                                           
II. MILITARY COMPENSATION OVERVIEW 
Before addressing the specifics of the Navy’s officer bonus programs, it is 
necessary to briefly outline the current Navy pay structure, which is the same in 
many respects, to the overall military pay structure.  The current officer pay 
system compensates military members via monetary payments and via non-cash 
services and benefits. 
 
 
A. MONETARY COMPENSATION 
 
1. Base Pay 
Base pay is the largest component of military compensation, comprising 
about 50 percent of all monetary compensation.1  Base pay is determined based 
on a servicemember’s rank and years of service.  Different Base Pay tables are 
used for Officers and Enlisted personnel, but base pay is not based on one’s 
specific job within a given category. 
 
2. Housing Allowances 
For those military members who do not live in Navy-provided quarters, a 
Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) is provided to offset local rent or mortgage 
payments.  This pay varies by location commensurate with the relative prices of 
area housing, but also varies based on one’s rank and number of military 
dependants.  Officers stationed overseas receive a housing allowance called 
Overseas Housing Allowance in lieu of BAH.  Additionally, in locations with an 
especially high cost of living, such as Hawaii or San Diego, CA, military members 
are eligible to receive a Cost of Living Allowance (COLA). 
 
 
1.  Paul F. Hogan. “Overview of the Current Personnel and Compensation System.” In Cindy Williams 





   
 
3. Sustenance Allowances 
Navy Officers receive a monthly payment for the purpose of offsetting food 
expenses.  This Basic Allowance for Sustenance (BAS) is common across all 
pay grades and does not vary with location or family composition. 
 
4. Special Pays and Bonuses 
There also exist various other special pay programs that are either 
occupation-specific or location specific.   Examples of these include Submarine 
Pay, Aviation Pay, Sea Pay, Family Separation Pay, and Combat Pay.  These 
payments compensate for members being away from home or directly in harms 
way.  Additionally, the bonuses for Aviators, Submarine Officers, and Surface 
Warfare Officers are a means of attracting new entrants into a given community 
and retaining existing members that have already been trained.  Bonuses are 
described more thoroughly in CHAPTER III.  It is in this area of compensation 
where payment variations occur irrespective of age, tenure, or an individual’s 
number of dependents.  As a result, these payments are used “to respond to 
retention or recruitment problems that vary by military occupation, by location or 
assignment or other circumstances.”2  Nevertheless, special pays, allowances 
and bonuses make up only about four percent of cash pay and three percent of 
total military compensation, according to the 2002 Report of the Ninth 
Quadrennial Defense Review of Military Compensation.  
 
5. Retirement Pay 
The military retirement system is quickly becoming one of the last defined-
benefit plans offered to new employees.  After completing 20 years of active 
service, military members are fully vested in the military pension plan, with no 
vesting prior to the 20-year point.  Nevertheless, the present value of such a 
guaranteed stream of payments is very large.  However, many new entrants to                                          
2.  Paul F. Hogan. “Overview of the Current Personnel and Compensation System.” In Cindy Williams 





military service undervalue the potential pension for which they may become 
eligible, putting more focus on yearly pay and compensation.  This could be, in 
part, a result of the large discount rate often used by younger workers and the 
perceived-distant time horizon until retirement is an option.  On the other hand, 
some servicemembers may very well have no intention to serve 20 years, and as 
a result place no value on the potential retirement pay. 
 
 
B. NON-MONETARY COMPENSATION 
 
1. Healthcare 
Military members and their families receive medical and dental coverage 
through the TRICARE system.  As healthcare costs rise in the U.S. market, so 
too do the Navy’s expenditures on healthcare for its employees.  While this is a 
non-monetary benefit to members, it is a real expense for the Navy and the 
Department of Defense as a whole. 
 
2. Services 
Military members also enjoy the use of various services from which non- 
military members are restricted.  Namely, Defense Commissaries, Navy 
Exchanges, and various Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) services 
available only to uniformed personnel.  These institutions generally offer goods 
and services at prices that are well below the civilian equivalent.  Similarly, 
services are available to members and their families, such as spousal 
employment assistance, financial consulting and services, legal services, and 
low-cost child care centers.    
 
3. Tax Exemptions 
While the “pays” described above are taxed as ordinary income under the 




that military members receive is the tax exemption of a significant portion of their 
pay.  For instance, BAH, BAS, and COLA are some of the benefits that are not 
taxed at all.  Even the military members who live in military quarters, who 
therefore do not receive BAH, are still receiving an equivalent amount of housing 
which is effectively tax-free.  Those members who buy their own home not only 
receive the federal mortgage interest deduction, but they are able to pay at least 
part of their mortgage with what amounts to pre-tax dollars.  Pay earned while 
serving in combat zones is very often tax–free as well.  
 
4. Personal Satisfaction 
Though not quantifiable, it cannot be ignored that members of the Armed 
Forces receive some sense of accomplishment as a result of their service.  
These benefits might come in the form of self-confidence, sense of duty, 
personal pride, and various other intrinsic motivators and hygiene factors.  
Military pay policy and cost analysis cannot address this form of compensation to 
the servicemembers, but military regulations and personnel treatment can be 
crafted under the recognition that members of the uniformed services perform 
their jobs not only for pay and services.  In addition, the training received by 
servicemembers can be considered a form of compensation.  Many skills learned 
while performing military service are transferable to the private sector. 
 
 
C. NAVY COMPENSATION ANALYSIS 
 
1. Total Compensation 
As seen above, the Navy, and military as a whole, is wrought with various 
sources of compensation, which come in both monetary and non-monetary 
forms.  This general structure has been in place in excess of a half century.  
Though the pay, benefits, and services available to members is significant, they 




                                           
receive no benefit from the multitude of family services that are available.  
Nevertheless, there is no equal service available in its place.  Similarly, those 
choosing to live further away from their duty station do not enjoy the benefits of 
childcare services available near many bases.  As a result, many of the services 
provided for members can be undervalued and underutilized by those for whom it 
is designed.       
Although the above-mentioned benefits are real and do provide a value to 
some members, the overall structure is such that comparison to the civilian 
workforce is nearly impossible.  As a result, servicemembers are unable to 
compare their compensation among alternatives, causing some to make 
decisions regarding continued service on other factors.  A straightforward 
solution to this problem would be to emphasize the value of certain services and 
non-monetary compensation to military members.  This is accomplished in the 




It has long been argued that the military compensation mechanism, in 
general, does not provide the necessary flexibility to respond quickly to changing 
internal needs or external market forces.4  With such a rigid pay scale, the Armed 
Forces are unable to provide performance-based compensation or merit pay, but 
rather rely on a tenure-based system.  Additionally, since uniformed servicemen 
are not vested in the retirement program until their 20th year of service, members 
are reluctant to separate as they move closer to that milestone.  The military 
therefore relies on involuntary separations or separation incentives schemes to 
reduce personnel inventory levels.  This can result in reduced morale and views 
that the military is acting insensitively toward its people by removing them from 
 
3. Thomas M. Strawn. “The War for Talent in the Private Sector.” In Cindy Williams (ed.), Filling the 
Ranks: Transforming the U.S. Military Personnel System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. 
4. Beth Asch and James Hosek. “Looking to the Future: What Does Transformation Mean for Military 




pension eligibility.  Such a system does not provide the required flexibility for 




                                           
III. NAVY BONUS PROGRAMS 
Since changing to an All-Volunteer Force (AVF), military personnel 
planning has depended on the broader United States labor market conditions.  
As a result, to meet personnel manning objectives, the Department of Defense 
must be able to compete with private sector pay and compensation.  Moreover, 
the uniformed services must also meet specific billet requirements, by attracting 
or retaining those military officers that have desirable skills.  Targeted Bonus Pay 
has been used as a means of meeting these manning objectives. 
Current bonus programs all have the common objectives of retaining 
trained and skilled officers while attracting new officers into a specific career 
pipeline.  The aviation, surface warfare, and the submarine communities are 
among those career fields where bonuses are being implemented in the Navy 




A. AVIATION COMMUNITY 
 
1. Aviation Career Incentive Pay 
Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) is a monthly incentive payment 
available to all “Regular and Reserve Officers who hold, or are in a training 
syllabus that will lead to, an aeronautical rating or designation and who engage 
and remain in aviation service on a career basis.”5  Pay amounts are based on 
years of aviation service, including flight training.  The monthly amount increases 
at a step rate from $125, for 2 or less years of aviation service, to $840, for over 
14 years of aviation service.  That the incentive amount increases significantly at 
the 6 and 14-year points, and then drops on an incremental basis, is not a 
  
5 Chief of Naval Personnel.  BUPERS Instruction 7220.29A (series): Aviation Career Incentive Pay 




 coincidence.  These amounts are targeted at critical career points where a 
bonus might influence retention behavior.  See the following table for complete 
ACIP amounts. 
 
Years of aviation service
(includes flight training) 
Monthly Rate
2 or Less $125 
Over 2 $156 
Over 3 $188 
Over 4 $206 
Over 6 $650 
Over 14 $840 
Over 22 $585 
Over 24 $385 
Over 25 $250 
Table 1.   Aviation Career Incentive Pay (after Chief of Naval Personnel.  BUPERS 
Instruction 7220.29A (series): Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP): GPO 
17 Jun 2002). 
 
 
2. Aviation Career Continuation Pay 
Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP) is designed to supplement 
ACIP to provide further incentive for qualified Pilots and Naval Flight Officers 
(NFO) to continue their aeronautical career path within the Navy.  ACCP is only 
available to those Pilots and NFOs who have completed their initial Active Duty 
Service Obligation (ADSO) and are at a career point where military separation is 
an option.  As a result, the sums of money involved are significantly larger than 
the ACIP, while increased restrictions are put in place.  ACCP is only available to 
those aviation officers who are qualified or “winged” with a favorable 
recommendation from their Commanding Officer.  Additionally, officers are not 
eligible to receive ACCP beyond the 25th year of military service or if they have 




five additional years of aviation service, payable in five or six equal installments 
on the anniversary of the individual’s commencement date. 
Those officers not willing to commit to an additional five years of aviation 
service can take part in a “short-term” ACCP contract for a period of two years for 
at-sea service or three years for command billets or astronauts.  For this shorter 
commitment, aviation officers are paid a bonus amount of $15,000 annually. 
 
ACCP - type Total amount received 
Five year commitment $125,000 
Two years at a sea command $30,000 
Three years in command billet $45,000 
Three years as astronaut $45,000 




B. SUBMARINE COMMUNITY 
 
1. Submarine Duty Incentive Pay 
Submarine Duty Incentive Pay (SUBPAY) is analogous to ACIP described 
above.  It is designed to attract and retain submarine service personnel “on a 
career basis.”6  It is a monthly payment that is based on rank and years of 
military service.  As a result, the corresponding chart is a bit more complex and 
appears much like the charts often seen for Base Pay for all military personnel.  
A similar trend is still evident in the SUBPAY breakdown with incrementally larger 




                                            





































O-10 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 
O-9 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 
O-8 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 
O-7 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 
O-6 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 835 835 835 835 
O-5 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 595 790 835 835 835 835 835 
O-4 365 365 365 525 595 705 705 705 790 790 790 790 790 790 
O-3 355 355 355 510 595 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 705 
O-2 305 305 305 305 305 305 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 
O-1 230 230 230 230 230 230 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 
Table 3.   Submarine Duty Incentive Pay (after Secretary of the Navy. SECNAVINST 
7220.65L: Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay.  30 OCT 2003) 
 
 
2. Nuclear Accessions Bonus 
The Nuclear Accessions Bonus is a one-time payment made to those 
individuals selected to enter the Naval nuclear power training pipeline.  In effect, 
it serves as a signing bonus for those officers who decide to pursue a career 
involving Naval nuclear propulsion in the submarine or surface warfare 
community.  This bonus is currently $10,000. 
 
3. Nuclear Career Accessions Bonus 
Officers who successfully complete the Naval nuclear propulsion training 
program, receive the Nuclear Career Accessions Bonus.  It consists of another 
one-time payment made upon successful completion of the two phases of Naval 
nuclear propulsion training: Naval Nuclear Power Training Command and 
Nuclear Power Training Unit (commonly referred to as “nuclear power school” 






4. Nuclear Officer Continuation Pay 
The Nuclear Officer Continuation Pay (COPAY) bonus program is a 
parallel to the ACCP described above.  It is designed to provide incentives to 
nuclear trained officers who have qualified as engineer officer of a nuclear-
powered ship.  Eligible officers can select a contract length of three, four, or five 
years in length.  Officers that select a four-year or five-year contract receive an 
annual bonus payment of $25,000.  Officers that opt for the three-year 
commitment receive an annual bonus of $22,000. 
Once an officer is within one year of completing his or her minimum 
service requirement (MSR), he or she may enter into a COPAY agreement and 
receive equal annual payments prior to service.  For instance, a nuclear qualified 
officer one year from completing his MSR, who meets the requirements to enter 
into a COPAY contract for five years of continued service, will receive six annual 
payments of $20,833.33, vice five annual payments of $25,000. 
 
COPAY - type Total amount (equal annual payments)
Five-year commitment $125,000 
Four-year commitment $100,00 
Three-year commitment $75,000 
Table 4.   Nuclear Officer Continuation Pay. 
 
 
5. Annual Incentive Bonus 
Nuclear-qualified officers wishing to continue service on an annual basis 
without committing to more than three years of service receive the Annual 
Incentive Bonus (AIB).  The AIB is an annual bonus payment of $12,500 paid 
upon completion of each full year of additional service.  This differs from the 




                                           
an officer elects to receive the AIB, but separates from the Submarine 




C. SURFACE WARFARE COMMUNITY 
 
1. Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay 
Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP or “SWO bonus”) is 
equivalent to the ACCP and the nuclear COPAY described above, with a goal of 
improving officer retention in an effort to fully man the current and projected 
surface warfare officer department head billets.  Those entering into the SWOCP 
program are obligated to remain on active duty to complete one or more 
assignments as a department head afloat.7  As an incentive to continued service, 
the SWOCP offers signors $50,000 paid in five installments.  The first payment is 
made upon acceptance of the contract, with the four subsequent payments being 
made once the officer begins his or her department head assignment or 
department head school (whichever is earlier), and each year thereafter on that 
anniversary. 
 
2. Junior Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Retention Bonus 
A recent addition to the bonus structure of the surface warfare community 
is the Junior Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Retention Bonus (Junior SWO 
CSRB).  The Junior SWO CSRB is in addition to the SWOCP and is “designed to 
be a career incentive, paying eligible lieutenants $25,000 to stay in the Navy and 
the SWO community through the ninth year of commissioned service (YCS) and 
completion of 2 department head tours or the equivalent.”8  Officers are paid 
 
7. Secretary of the Navy. SECNAVINST 7220.84: Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay 
(SWOCP).  14 Jan 2000. 
8.  Chief of Naval Operations. NAVADMIN 012/06: Junior Surface Warfare Critical Skills 




$15,000 on the anniversary of their 6th year of service, and $5,000 each on the 
anniversary of their 7th and 8th year of service.  Although the two aforementioned 
programs run concurrently, they must be applied for individually. 
 
3. Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Bonus 
The Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Bonus (SWOCS bonus) is 
aimed at more senior surface warfare officers who have already served, or are 
serving, in a department head billet.  As a result, it is only available to Lieutenant 
Commanders (LCDR), paying up to $46,000 to remain on active duty in the 
Surface Warfare Community through their 15th year of commissioned service.  
Eligible officers are paid in three installments commencing two years after having 
been promoted to the rank of LCDR, with two additional annual payments 
thereafter.  Those officers signing a multi-year contract receive an initial payment 
of $22,000 followed by two payments of $12,000.  Not signing a multi-year 
contract instead results in three equal payments of $12,000 each.  The following 
table illustrates the total payments. 
 
SWOCSB - type Total amount paid 
Three-year Commitment $46,000 
Single year commitment $12,000 
3 single year commitments $36,000 
Table 5.   Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Bonus. 
 
 
4. Senior Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Retention Bonus 
As a means of providing incentives to more senior surface warfare 
officers, the Senior Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Retention Bonus 
(Senior SWO Bonus) was created.  This program offers Commanders (CDR/O-5) 
serving in eligible billets a yearly bonus of $15,000 while paying Captains 




to those surface warfare officers serving in eligible positions as determined by 
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).  The Senior SWO Bonus is not available to 
those officers who have completed 25 years of active duty service or who will 
complete their 25th year prior to the end of a payment period. 
 
Senior SWO Bonus Amount paid 
CDR / O-5 $15,000 per year 
CAPT / O-6 $20,000 per year 
Table 6.   Senior Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Retention Bonus. 
 
 
5. Nuclear-trained Surface Warfare Officers 
For those surface warfare officer who have completed the training and 
qualification requirements to serve as engineer officer of a Naval nuclear 
propulsion plant, the above-mentioned nuclear bonuses are payable in 
conjunction with the surface warfare officer bonuses.  Namely, the Nuclear 
Accessions Bonus, Nuclear Career Accessions Bonus, Nuclear Officer 
Continuation Pay, and the Annual Incentive Pay are available as described in the 





A. AUCTION VOCABULARY 
 
Although auctions can vary significantly based on location, rules, or 
format, there are certain terms that are constant throughout any auction.  For 
instance, in any auction there are bidders and bid-takers.  Bidders are the 
persons or entities competing against each other for the winning price.  The bid-
takers are those who receive the price offers proposed by the bidders.  On the 
other hand, there are sellers and buyers.  A seller is one who has a good or 
service that he or she is willing to provide at the right price.  The buyer, however, 
is the one looking to purchase the good or service from the seller.           
The most commonly recognized auction is one with a single seller of a 
good and multiple buyers competing for the right to buy the good.  This is called 
a forward auction, and is often used for selling artwork, furniture, or other 
individual items.  For this type of auction the winner is the bidder willing to pay 
the seller the highest price for the item.  However, there exists a case with one 
buyer in search of a good or service with multiple sellers vying for the right to 
provide the service.  This type of auction is called a reverse auction, and is 
commonly used by governments for contracting services to build weapon 
systems, erect buildings, and create labor contracts.  In this situation the winner 
is the bidder willing to sell the good or perform the service at the lowest cost to 
the buyer.  At the end of this section, Table 7 shows auction terms as they apply 
to both forward and reverse auctions.   
In the end, it would appear that the real “winner” is the person or entity in 
the power position, able to receive the highest possible price for an item or 
contract a service at the lowest available cost.  More specifically, the seller in the 
forward auction is considered a monopolist while the buyer in the reverse 
auction is a monopsonist.  This is not lost in the design of auctions, which would 




cases where the monopolist / monopsonist is at a disadvantage.  In fact, it is the 
asymmetry of information that is the fundamental reason to use an auction as the 
means of engaging in trade. 
The key piece of information in an auction is the value of a good or service 
being auctioned-off.  Two cases are considered in the valuation of the good or 
service for auction.  In the first case, an item such as a piece of artwork or 
property is being sold at auction.  In this case the good is part of a market and 
can be transferred or resold.  There is an accepted value for such an item.  
Nevertheless, no one knows the exact value until it is purchased.  Each bidder 
may have an idea of what it might be worth but cannot be sure.  As a result, the 
bidders will base their bids on those of the other bidders.  This auction model is 
called a common value model.  On the other hand, there are some things 
available for auction that are only of value to the bidder.  A contractor bidding for 
the right to provide a service knows what the contract will likely cost him, though 
he may not know what it will cost the other bidders.  Knowledge of this 
information does not effect his valuation though, since he will be paying for the 
work and would gain nothing to bid a price below his actual costs plus a desired 
profit.  Similarly, someone bidding for an item for sentimental or personal reasons 
knows what he is willing to pay for such an item, regardless of what others are 
willing to pay.  This auction model is called an independent-private-values 
model. 
A means of expressing valuation by bidders in the conduct of an auction is 
through the use of a reservation price.  Reservation price is the maximum a 
bidding buyer is willing to pay for an item in a forward auction, or the minimum a 
bidding seller would accept in a reverse auction.  This term is also referred to 
simply as “valuation” in discussions about auctions.  Alternatively, bid-takers can 
make use of a reserve price, not necessarily as a form of valuation, but as a 
way of ensuring adequate/sufficient rent is exchanged in the transaction.  A 
reserve price is the minimum a bid-taking seller is willing to accept for an item in 
a forward auction, or the maximum a bid-taking buyer is willing to pay in a 




reservation price known is an important element to auction design.  If a bid-taker 
announces the reserve price, it could have the effect of anchoring bids to that 
value, resulting in minimizing economic rent received by the bid-taker.  On the 
other hand, bidders who reveal their reservation price risk being out-bid as other 
bidders learn their valuation of the item for auction. 
 
Forward Auction  Reverse Auction 






High-bidder Winner Low-bidder 
Maximum a bidder is 
willing to pay 
Reservation 
Price 
Minimum a bidder is 
willing to accept 
Minimum a bid-taker is 
willing to accept 
Reserve Price 
Maximum a bid-taker is 
willing to pay 
Table 7.   Auction vocabulary as it applies to forward and reverse auctions. 
 
 
B. TYPES OF AUCTIONS 
 
1. Ascending-bid 
Often called the open, oral, or English auction, this is the most commonly 
applied and recognized type of auction.  In an ascending-bid forward auction, 
bidders successively raise the offered price until only one bidder is left willing to 
pay the proposed price.  Once this point has been reached, the remaining bidder 
is said to have “won” the auction and the item or service for sale.  While the style 
of the English auction is set, the process may differ significantly.  An auctioneer 





                                           
may be allowed to call out their bids verbally or submit bids in written form or 
electronically, whereby at any point during the auction all other bidders know the 
current high bid. 
 
2. Descending-bid 
Commonly called the Dutch auction, the descending-bid forward auction is 
a form of auction whereby an initial price is proposed by an auctioneer and is 
successively lowered until a bidder willing to pay the price makes his desire to do 
so known.  In effect, it is the first bidder that wins due to the declining-price 
nature of the Dutch auction.  Similar to the English auction, all prospective 
bidders know the current asking price for the item or service up for auction.  In 
practice, Dutch auctions are used in Canada for selling tobacco, in the 
Netherlands for selling cut flowers, and in Israel for the sale of fish.9
 
3. First-price Sealed Bid 
In the First-price sealed bid auction, buyers submit bids that are sealed, 
and therefore unknown to the other bidders.  The winning bid is the one that has 
the highest price and is sold to the buyer at that price.  Bidders have only one 
opportunity to submit a bid and are unaware of what rivals are bidding.  This type 
of auction is used to sell mineral rights to government-owned land and 
government procurement contracts.10
 
4. Second-price Sealed Bid 
Second price sealed bid auctions, or Vickery Auctions, are similar to First 
price sealed bid auctions in that prospective buyers submit sealed bids on an 
item or service for amounts that are unknown to other bidders.  However, the 
winner of the auction is the bidder who bids the highest price, but the winner 
pays a price equal to the second-highest bid.  In effect, the winner pays the price 
 
9.  R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan. “Auctions and Bidding.” Journal of Economic Literature 
Vol. XXV, June 1987, 699-738. 




                                           
of the first losing bid.  In theory, the optimal bidding strategy is for participants to 
bid their true values.  In practice, second-price auctions often lead bidders to 




C. BIDDING STRATEGIES 
 
1. First-price, Sealed Bid Auction 
In a first-price, sealed bid auction, the winning bidder pays what he bid for 
a forward auction, or gets paid what he bid in a reverse auction.  In this case, his 
surplus depends entirely on his bid.  A bidder in a forward auction who bids 
below his valuation and wins receives a profit, or the bidder in a reverse auction 
who bids above his reservation price and wins, receives a surplus.  However, the 
bidder must estimate what others are likely to bid to maximize his chances of 
winning.  In the case where there are multiple winners in a first price auction, 
each bidder will still pay (receive) an amount equal to his bid.  However, one can 
base bidding decisions on the number of items up for auction and the number of 
bidders.  Bidders can use this information to bid an amount that provides the 
most profit or surplus, knowing that their bid directly controls the amount of profit 
or surplus received.  In the end, in the first-price, sealed bid auction, “the bidder 
bids some amount less than his true valuation [in a forward auction]: Exactly how 
much less depends upon the probability distribution of the other bidders’ 
valuations and the number of competing bidders.”11  The opposite is true for a 
reverse auction; bidders will bid above their true valuation based on expectations 
of how others bid.        
   
 
11  R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan. “Auctions and Bidding.” Journal of Economic Literature 




                                           
2. Second-price, Sealed Bid Auction 
In a second-price, sealed bid auction the winning bidder pays an amount 
equal to the second-highest bid in a forward auction.  Likewise, in a reverse 
auction, the winner is paid an amount equal to the first, non-winning bid.  In this 
case, one’s bid is only used to determine if he is a winner.  The amount that he 
pays (or is paid) depends only on the bids of others.  If a bidder decides to raise 
his bid above his valuation in a reverse auction, this will change the outcome only 
if this bid is higher than someone else’s bid, and makes his bid the first, non-
winning bid.  In such a situation, he has affected the outcome but is not a winner 
in the auction.  It is therefore in the bidder’s own interest to bid an amount equal 
to his true valuation, knowing that if he wins, he will be paid more than his bid.  
The opposite is true for a forward auction.  In either case, for a second-price, 
sealed bid auction, “each bidder’s equilibrium strategy is to submit a bid equal to 
his own valuation of the item.”12   
 
 
D. APPLICATION OF AUCTIONS TO THE NAVY 
 
Auctions applied to Navy Officer Bonuses would be in the form of a 
reverse auction, comprised of multiple sellers and a single buyer.  In this case, 
active duty URL officers would be sellers bidding for the right to sell their labor to 
a lone buyer, the Navy.  As such, the auction would require a specific format.  
The format would have to be selected based on the location and availability of 
the participants.  Since Navy Officers are deployed around the world on any 
given day, the ability to host a live auction is severely limited.  Even if the auction 
were conducted online, the logistics of hosting such an auction would be 
extremely difficult.  Moreover, since there would be more than one winning 
bidder, the live auction format would be inappropriate. 
 
12  R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan. “Auctions and Bidding.” Journal of Economic Literature 




The most suitable format for implementation is one of the sealed-bid 
auctions.  This would allow bidders to submit bids over time, as scheduling and 
mobility permit.  The Navy would then select the number of officers needed for 
any given warfare community, and there would be that quantity of winning 
bidders, each of whom would be eligible for continued service in the Navy.  
However, how does the Navy decide whether to conduct a first-price or second- 
price auction?  What are the implications of each? 
Implementing a first-price sealed bid auction would mean that each 
winning bidder would receive a bonus equal to the price that he or she bid.  This 
would likely provide the Navy with net cost savings, since some officers would be 
willing to accept bonuses below the current levels as described in Chapter III.  
This would, however, result in officers of equal rank and tenure potentially 
earning different amounts, which is in contrast with current Navy practices. 
On the other hand, a second-price sealed bid auction might not provide 
significant departure from where the Navy stands today.  Theoretically, the 
current system of Navy Bonus Programs would have the same result as a 
second-price auction.  Remember that in a second-price reverse auction the 
winning bidders would be paid an amount equal to the first losing bid.  Effectively, 
the offered bonus would have to be just high enough to keep the next marginal 
bidder.  The current policy creates the same result.  As retention rates tend to 
drop off below the desired level, bonus amounts are increased to induce enough 
officers to remain in their respective warfare communities, without offering a 
larger bonus whereby too many officers would be willing to remain in service.       
 
1. Auctions in Practice 
          
a. Assignment Incentive Pay 
The 2003 National Defense Authorization Act gave the Uniformed 
Services the authority to implement a program known as Assignment Incentive 




member of a uniformed service who performs service, while entitled to basic pay, 
in an assignment designated by the [Service] Secretary.”  The Navy’s response 
to this new authority was to create a type of auction where sailors could submit 
bids online indicating what additional monthly pay they required in exchange for 
accepting duty at undesirable locations.  Bids were accepted in $50 increments 
up to a disclosed maximum reserve price of $1,500.  The format was essentially 
a first-price sealed bid auction. 
  
b. Voluntary Separation Incentive  
  Based on positive results of implementing auctions into Assignment 
Incentive Pay for hard-to-fill jobs, it has been proposed that Voluntary 
Separations, when required, be conducted under a similar first-price sealed bid 
format.  Such a program would allow the Navy flexibility when reducing manning 
levels while providing potential cost savings by allowing individuals to compete.      
 
2. Potential Results 
 Recruiting goals and attracting the desired number of new 
servicemembers are two goals of the military compensation system.  “The 
purpose of the military compensation system is to attract, retain and motivate 
sufficient numbers of qualified people in the military, to separate them gracefully, 
and to do so efficiently.” (Williams: Hogan, 29).  However, quantity and quality of 
people are inextricably linked.  Auctions in general can provide the required 
quantity of personnel desired by the Navy.  Accordingly, the concept of quality 
must be addressed.  
 
a. Adverse Selection 
By accepting only the lowest bidders in an officer bonus auction, 
the Navy risks several undesired results.  The first of which is called adverse 
selection.  If the two alternatives for an officer are (1) remaining in the Navy and 
(2) leaving the Navy in search of a private sector job, the officer will weigh her 
options and likelihood of success in each occupation.  Those who feel that they 
would be less likely to find suitable employment outside of the Navy will be prone 
to place low bids for bonuses allowing them to remain on active duty.  A possible 
result in this scenario is one where those who see themselves having limited 
success outside of the military are the lowest bidders and the Navy retains an 
officer corps comprised of men and women that feel their outside options are 
limited.   
This concept can be viewed though a focus on skills.  For this 
purpose, suppose that there are two kinds of skills (1) military-specific skills (e.g. 
driving a submarine, conning a ship, landing an aircraft on an aircraft carrier) and 
general skills (e.g. managerial ability, general level of education).  Figure 1 
provides a graphical view of potential skill combinations. 
 
Skill Combinations




   



























Ideally, the Navy would like to retain officers who possess high 
levels of both skills (upper-right quadrant of Figure 1).  However, officers 
possessing that skill set are also those officers most likely to succeed in the 
private sector.  As a result, it is probable that their bids on a bonus to remain in 
service would be highest.  Conversely, those possessing lower levels of each 
skill (lower-left quadrant of Figure1) are less desirable to the Navy and the 
private sector.  Accordingly, in a bonus pay auction, officers in this lower-left 
quadrant are likely to bid low, given limited options outside of their current 
position.  Consequently, the lowest bidders are likely to be those possessing a 
skill set that is less than desirable for the Navy, resulting in a shortage of officers 
with desired skills. 
Although auctions are not currently implemented, the same adverse 
selection outcome is possible when officers voluntarily sign contracts for future 
service under the various bonus programs described above.  Under the present 
system, part of this problem is addressed.  A requirement that is consistent 
across communities is that in order to be eligible for a particular bonus, a positive 
endorsement must be attained by one’s previous Commanding Officer or 
equivalent.  This endorsement is based on military performance as demonstrated 
while at the command and documented in Fitness Reports.  In so doing, the 
Navy seeks to ensure that officers serving under bonus programs at least fall into 
the upper part of the skill combination illustrated in Figure1, by possessing 
adequate military-specific skills. 
 
b. Adverse Perception 
By adopting a policy which uses auctions to award bonuses to the 
lowest bidder, the Navy risks being perceived as opportunistic, taking advantage 
of one’s willingness to accept less compensation for continued service.  In fact, 
the Navy’s compensation system embodies the concept that personnel receive 
equal pay for equal tenure and community.  This is demonstrated in Navy 




                                           
Furthermore, it is written into current bonus program policy.  For instance, under 
the Submarine Officer Continuation Pay (COPAY) program described in Chapter 
III, eligible officers may sign a three, four, or five-year contract, thereby receiving 
an annual bonus at the currently offered rate.  However, the instruction goes on 
to say that “should the amount paid to officers who subsequently apply for 
COPAY be increased, officers with an agreement in effect at a lower rate may 
request a new agreement at the higher rate.”  In other words, once a different 
amount is made available, all officers are eligible to renegotiate the terms of the 
existing contract, therefore ensuring equal bonus pay among officers in the same 
occupation. 
Although this model is rarely seen in the private sector, deviation 
from it could result in adverse perception of the Navy by current and former 
employees, as well as the general public as a whole.  To do so would require a 
significant Navy communication campaign to mitigate any negative implications.  
Beyond perception is an operational concern, it has been said that the “military’s 
continued use of equal pay across occupations may result from the institutional 
paradigm that occupational pay differentials would harm unit cohesion and 
teamwork.”13 (William: Hogan 43)  The author did not find any studies of this 
dynamic pertaining to the military.  One result, however, of the current approach 
is that officers with certain skills will be underpaid while others are overpaid and 
market forces and signals are not evident in the military occupation.            
 
13.  Paul F. Hogan. “Overview of the Current Personnel and Compensation System.” In Cindy 


































The concept of Auction Theory as discussed in the pervious chapter deals 
with information asymmetry.  Sellers don’t know what buyers are willing to pay 
and buyers aren’t sure what other buyers are willing to pay.  Application of 
Auction theory to Navy Officer Bonus Programs, by definition would lead to the 
retention of a sufficient number of officers.  There is another school of thought 
addressing hidden information that gives insight into the problem of job applicant 
quality in the job market: Signaling Theory.    
Job market signaling is a concept brought to light by Michael Spence in 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1973.  It can be used to resolve 
information asymmetry between an employer and a prospective employee.  Prior 
to hiring an employee, an employer has very little information on which to base 
her decision.  In fact, for some time after hiring a new employee, his productivity 
can remain a mystery during training and/or an initial familiarization period 
common to many occupations.  How then, can an employer better judge potential 
job applicants?  The article addresses a way for employers to differentiate 
between potential job applicants based not only on unalterable characteristics, 
called indices, such as age and gender but also on attributes, called signals, that 







14. Michael Spence. “Job Market Signaling.”  The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 87, No. 3, 




                                           
 
B. SIGNALING IN PRACTICE 
 
1. Labor Market 
An illustration of this concept as portrayed by Spence involves new 
entrants to the labor market.  Effectively Spence asked two questions, “whether, 
in a competitive marketplace, sellers of above-average quality products could 
“signal” this fact by taking some costly action.  On the other side of the market, 
could the uninformed buyers use the costly action as a way to “screen” for 
quality?” (Riley, Silver 1).  Since asymmetrical information puts the employer at a 
disadvantage, she must look to signals made on the part of the applicant to infer 
the missing information.  An obvious potential signal exists in looking at 
education.  One who invests considerable time, money and effort into receiving 
successful secondary education signals to the employer that he possesses the 
required skills to gain employment.  If the investment were too great and 
exceeded the expected benefits, the potential employee would not bother with 
the additional education, but rather accept a lower-paying job.  Effectively, 
applicants have distinguished themselves from one another on the basis of 
education.  In 1973 such a distinction could be inferred by having received a 
college education.  Today, as college graduation is more common, perhaps 
graduate education could be a similar signal to employers.  In either case, 
employers are able to gain valuable information from the signals put forth by the 
applicants. 
 
2. Automobile Market 
In 1970, George Akerlof wrote about information asymmetry as it pertains 
to used automobiles.15  Many vehicles look alike In the used-car market.  
However, the information unknown to a prospective buyer is the real quality or 
history of a particular vehicle, known only by the current owner.  As a result, the 
 
15. George A. Akerlof. “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality, Uncertainty, and the Market mechanism.” 




average worth of used cars is derived from past experience and potential buyers 
base buying decisions on this average.  The highest quality cars will likely be 
sold immediately or kept by their owners, resulting in a market consisting only of 
“lemons.”  This idea is called adverse selection, which is the result of the 
asymmetrical information in the market.  Applying signaling to this concept 
results in a thus-far successful solution to the lemon market.  Modern-day 
automobile dealers have attempted to remove the lemon-market stigma attached 
to used cars by implementing a “certified pre-owned” market consisting of 
vehicles that have undergone extensive tests or inspections.  These vehicles 
have been subject to a process that costs time and money on the part of the 
dealer.  The result is a “signal” to potential buyers that such vehicles are of better 
quality than the others in the marketplace, and are sold at a premium.         
 
2. Insurance Market 
Another form of signaling used to avert adverse selection is employed in 
the private insurance market.  While providers of insurance would prefer to know 
everything about those wishing to purchase insurance, the customer does not 
reveal all relevant information.  As a result, insurers rely on signaling by allowing 
the customers to segment themselves.  This is done through the use of various 
combinations of deductibles and premium payments.  Most often, insurance 
providers (medical insurance for instance) offer policies with high deductibles and 
low recurring premiums or policies with low deductibles and high recurring 
premiums (with various combinations in between).  While the insurer may not 
know how to sort the customers, such a schedule allows customers to sort 
themselves.  Those who consider themselves to be healthy and less likely to 
require medical treatment select a high deductible, low premium plan.  On the 
other hand, one who is unhealthy, or has a predisposition to be so, would be 
more likely to select a low deductible, high premium plan due to his propensity to 






the behavior of the customers, and reflect this in insurance decisions.  Obviously 




C. APPLICATION TO THE NAVY 
 
1. Key Promotion Points 
One way that signaling is used in the Navy is through an officer’s 
attainment of key promotion points.  In the Navy, as in each of the other services, 
upward promotion is contingent upon satisfactory performance as well as 
achieving key milestones in one’s career.  Examples of these milestones include 
community-specific qualifications, successful completion of Joint Professional 
Military Education (JPME), and successful completion of a graduate degree 
program.  Completing these activities signals to the Navy Personnel Command 
and promotion boards that an individual is putting forth the required effort to be 
promoted.  However, many of these key points are scheduled into an officer’s 
career path within a warfare community, not allowing an officer to actively signal 
his or her intentions.  In the end, the Navy does not know which officers intend to 
continue service and which intend to separate, causing all members to receive 
equal compensation regardless of one’s personal “reservation price.”   
 
2. Up-or-out Contracts 
Like many other occupations, the Navy uses a promotion-based system 
that can be called “up-or-out,” after a predetermined period of employment, if 
promotion does not occur, the employer reserves the right to terminate the 
employee-employer relationship (i.e. to fire the employee).  This method of 
contracting was implemented in the world of academia (requiring someone to 
earn tenure) or in the legal profession (necessitating layers make partner).  The 




                                           
of economic literature.  The idea behind such an employment policy is that 
employers set wages higher than the opportunity cost of the employee, with the 
hopes that the employee will increase his productivity enough to be retained.16  
Otherwise, the employee is involuntarily separated. 
While productivity in military service cannot be measured with dollars, it is 
nonetheless measured.  Fitness Reports are used to document an officer’s 
performance while stationed at a given command.  Officers should therefore seek 
to improve their military performance in order to meet their side of the up-or-out 
contract.  However, Fitness Reports are not the only determinant of one’s ability 
to be promoted.  The key promotion points discussed above are also vital to 
upward mobility.  As mentioned, they do not provide for active signaling by the 
individual to the Navy.  Fitness Reports can work the same way.  Officers with no 
intention of continuing Naval service can be evaluated favorably on Fitness 
Reports.  In fact, it makes sense to ensure that this is so, due to the officer’s 
ability to use Fitness Reports as evidence of military successes when 
transitioning to the private sector.  In the end, the Navy is left with the same 
asymmetrical information, whether or not an individual intends to continue 
service in the U. S. Navy.  Lacking this information, retention bonuses are levied 
to all officers when only some require additional monetary incentive.  
 
 
16.  Charles Kahn and Gur Huberman. “Two-sided Uncertainty and “Up-or-Out” Contracts.”  Journal 




























VI. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
A. INCORPORATING SIGNALING AND AUCTIONS TOGETHER 
Based on the previous chapters, it is evident that restructuring the officer 
bonus program is possible, though it must be done in an equitable way.  Auctions 
alone can provide the needed quantity of officers just as signaling alone can help 
ensure the right quality, but taken separately there is little potential for cost 
savings in an equitable format.  Combining them into a new program has great 
potential to provide flexibility to the Navy, maintain the appropriate quantity and 
quality of officers, and provide cost savings to the Navy, while providing 
continued servicemember satisfaction. 
The proposed program is one that allows officers to signal their intentions 
to the Navy by offering contacts of different lengths, with officers determining the 
respective bonus amounts by taking part in a reverse, second-price auction.  The 
signaling aspect of the program provides the Navy with insight into personnel 
manning trends, while allowing individuals to express their preferences 
financially.  The auction aspect of the program ensures competition for bonus 
amounts in a format that promotes honest bidding, while providing the Navy with 




The use of Fitness Reports to screen potential officers is a fundamental 
part of the promotion and bonus system, and should remain so.  By ensuring that 
all officers who continue service have at least the required military proficiency, 
the Navy increases the likelihood that those officers will provide the required 
skills in future periods.  On the other hand, the practice of offering the same 
bonus amounts to each officer is a potential source of cost savings to the Navy.  
Under the current system where each officer is eligible for the same bonus 
amounts, there are those who would surely be willing to remain on active duty for 
less.  Therefore, providing a menu of bonus amounts of varying timeframes is an 
intriguing idea.  
Some programs do offer different bonuses based on the contracted 
timeframe.  However, like the Submarine Community Program described in 
Chapter III, longer contracts pay more per year than shorter contracts.  This can 
provide an incentive for personnel to sign longer contracts.  While seemingly 
intuitive, this framework can also result in the separation of highly qualified 
officers who are not willing to sign long-term contracts.  Alternatively, offering 
higher bonus amounts for short-term contracts could easily result in more people 
taking the short-term contract for more money with the intention to do so 
repeatedly until retirement, offering no savings to the Navy.  Strict doctrinal 
adherence to this concept limits the Navy’s flexibility and limits options for higher 
skilled officers considering separation.    
      
 




Suppose the potential range of annual wages in the private sector 
available to Navy officers (or more generally opportunity costs for remaining on 
active duty) is shown in Figure 2 above.  This spectrum is based on current 
economic conditions, the individual officers’ general skill level, perceived 




service.  Those with a propensity to remain on active duty without large bonuses 
would be found on the lower end of the range while those with a propensity to 
leave the military for the private sector would fall on the high end of the range, 
requiring larger monetary incentives to continue military service.       
Assume also that the average wage (including base pay, BAS, and BAH) 
is $70,000 per year without a bonus.  Using a simple example of one bonus 
option, potential cost savings can be illustrated.  If the only bonus option 
available to officers is a four-year contract for an additional $20,000 per year (as 
depicted in Figure 3), the Navy will receive a certain number of officers who 
accept the terms.  However, some would have stayed for less money.  Actually, 
all but the last officer who is indifferent between the $90,000 per year 
(reservation price) and his opportunity in the private sector would accept less, 
providing each of them with a surplus.  
 
Figure 3. Base wage and wage of officer accepting a bonus of $20,000. 
 
 
None of the officers who have opportunities in the private sector in excess 
of the additional $20,000 per year would volunteer, causing the Navy to lose 
those officers who are likely to be highly-skilled.  Is the only method of retaining 
these highly skilled officers to offer a larger bonus to all officers?  This author 
says no.  Instead, by offering two types of contracts, the Navy could retain the 
appropriate number off officers but also capture some of those officers who might 









Now say that the Navy offers two bonus contracts: (1) a seven-year 
contract for $15,000 per year and (2) a one-year contract for $25,000 as shown 
in Figure 4 above.  In this case, those willing to remain in service for an annual 
bonus of $20,000 would still be willing to accept one of the two offered contracts.  
Additionally, some officers who would have previously been priced-out at 
$90,000 would now be willing to accept a contract, specifically those requiring a 
bonus between $20,000 and $25,000 per year.  Presented as such, there is 
nothing to inhibit all of the officers from electing contract (1) over multiple periods.  
Choosing such an option repeatedly provides the officers with the most surplus, 
but only if it is known that this amount will be offered each year ad infinitum.  
Therefore, an important distinction must be made between the two choices.   
In the annual bonus case, the bonus amount is higher, but it is for a much 
shorter timeframe.  If the one-year retention bonus amount varies each year, or is 
not even offered in years when competition with the private sector is limited, or 
the Navy chooses to shape the force, the dynamics of the bonus program 
change.  Incorporated into this type of format is a certain amount of risk.  There is 
the risk that the next annual bonus offered will decline, perhaps even below the 
$15,000 dollars being offered for a longer-term contract.  As a result, those who 







security provided by a long-term contract.  Concurrently, those officers who were 
reluctant to sign a contract for four years at $20,000 might be more likely to 
remain on active duty for an additional year at the new, higher rate. 
To mathematically demonstrate that not all officers will select the short-
term, high-bonus offer, the concept of discounting and probability can be used.  
An individual officer’s reservation wage (the lowest acceptable military wage 
based on private sector opportunities) is represented by R, with total wages 
including the available bonus amounts equal to B1 and B2.  B1 is the wage 
received while serving under a seven-year contract, while B2 is the higher wage 
amount received while serving under a one-year contract.  In both cases, the 
officer will receive a surplus above his reservation wage.  To compare the two 
options, it is necessary to look at the present value (PV) of seven years worth of 
surpluses for each contract.  In the first case, the present value of seven years of 
surpluses can be represented by the following formula, using a discount factor 
equal to D: 
 
PV = (B1 – R) + (B1 – R) ·D1 + (B1 – R) ·D2 + … + (B1 – R) ·D6
 
However, under the one-year contract there is a risk at the beginning of each 
year that the officer would not be selected for continued service.  Based on a 
probability of being eligible for the contract in the subsequent year equal to P, the 
present value of seven years worth of surpluses under the one-year contract can 
be calculated using the following formula: 
 
PV = (B2 – R) + P·(B2 – R)·D + P2·(B2-R) ·D2 + … + P6· (B2-R) ·D6
 
Assuming that wages in the military and in the private sector increase at a rate 
equal to inflation, and this is equal to the discount rate, D can be ignored.  The 





PV = 7· (B1 – R)  AND 
PV = (B2 – R) + P·(B2 – R)+ P2·(B2-R) + … + P6· (B2-R) 
 
For a given P, B1, and B2, there is a reservation price (R) at which an individual 
would prefer the lower wage, long-term contract to the higher wage, short-term 
contract.  Setting the two equations equal to each other and solving for R will 
yield the reservation wage at which an individual is indifferent between the two 
choices.   
 
7· (B1 – R)  =  (B2 – R) + P·(B2 – R)+ P2·(B2-R) + … + P6· (B2-R) 
 
Solving this equation using the given values above (B1 = $85,000, B2 = $95,000) 
with P = 75%, the reservation wage, R, comes out to equal approximately 
$75,000.  This shows that for the two available bonuses, with a 75% probability 
of being eligible for one-year contracts each year, officers with a reservation 
wage less than $75,000 are likely to receive the most surplus by selecting the 
longer-term contract, albeit at a lower bonus amount.             
Cost effectiveness can be viewed in three ways pertaining to this simple 
example.  First, if an equal number of people shift from the $20,000 per year 
bonus to each of the $15,000 and $25,000 options there is no additional cost to 
the Navy, but it has improved the overall officer skill set (more officers will choose 
to remain on active duty).  Next, if more people shift to the $15,000 level than 
move to the $25,000 the Navy will have saved costs and potentially increased 
the skill level of the retained officers.  Lastly, there is the case where more 
people shift to the $25,000 than the $15,000 increasing costs but also increasing 
the underlying skill set of the Navy’s officer corps.  It is important to remember 




Reports to screen officers to ensure that they do not fall into the lower portion of 
the skill combination diagram (Figure 1) on page 28. 
This simple example helps to illustrate that offering two bonus programs at 
different rates and time commitments can increase cost effectiveness at a 
minimum, but can also increase the overall quality of officers retained.  By 
allowing officers to signal their intentions to the Navy while accepting an amount 
of risk commensurate with their reservation price, the Navy can realize personnel 
improvements.  Using this as a first step, auctions can then be incorporated to 
help determine the appropriate monetary values to offer under each contract. 
                 
3. Auctions 
Continuing with the two bonus options above, a seven-year contract with 
an annual bonus and a one-year contract with a one-time, larger bonus, how 
does the Navy select the two bonus amounts?  At the present time, Navy Policy 
makers observe personnel retention changes from one period to another and 
raise bonus amounts incrementally, up to a Congressionally set maximum.  
However, the idea is to provide flexibility to the Navy, allowing responsiveness to 
the civilian labor market.  When the economy as a whole is strong and job market 
competition between the Navy and private sector is high, bonuses must be 
higher.  Conversely, when the general economy is weaker, resulting in reduced 
competition between the private sector and the military, bonuses should be 
reduced.  What better way to ensure that this takes place then to let the job 
market participants compete against one another in setting the bonus amounts? 
Since Navy officers must make the choice between continued service and 
the private sector, one of the considerations in doing so is financial.  Officers 
must consider forgone wages, opportunity for promotion, and opportunity for 
future choices when picking one occupation over another.  As a result, officers 
will have different financial preferences.  An officer who gains utility from some of 
the non-monetary forms of compensation described in Chapter II might require 




satisfaction and dedication to military service is high.  Such an officer would likely 
require a smaller bonus amount to remain on active duty.  An officer that does 
not receive the same non-monetary gain, and has aspirations of success in the 
private sector will likely require a larger bonus to remain in service, particularly 
under a long-term contract.  However, she may be willing to remain in the Navy 
for an additional year for a smaller amount than required for a longer-term 
commitment.   
As an example, the first officer might be willing to sign a seven-year 
contract in exchange for the $15,000 annual bonus discussed above.  He could 
be equally willing to sign a one-year contract.  The second officer may be more 
reluctant to sign a multi-year contract, and would therefore require a significantly 
larger bonus to do so (e.g., $50,000).  A one-year contract, however, is not as 
binding as a longer one and still allows her to have flexibility in her career choice 
one year from now.  She may therefore be willing to remain on active duty for 
another year with a bonus amount less than that of a multi-year contract (e.g., 
$25,000). 
By implementing an auction for bonus amounts, the Navy helps to ensure 
that bonuses will be competitive with the overall job market.  Knowing that 
officers are competing against each other to set the bonus amounts also helps to 
keep bonus amounts low.  This can be accomplished through the offering of a 
second price, sealed-bid auction.  The number of contracts to be chosen from 
each auction can be set by Navy policy-makers.  Such a tool will provide added 
flexibility to the Navy’s force shaping mechanism.  For instance, if the Navy 
anticipates reductions in the number of required officers in the subsequent years, 
more officers can be selected from the short-term contract auction.  Force levels 
can continue to be evaluated on a yearly basis and the ratio of the number of 










 Officers with any interest in continued service in their respective warfare 
community would take part in an auction for each of the two offered contracts 
(short-term and long-term).  Officers must bid on both contract lengths.  It is in 
this manner that signaling enters the picture.  Officers signal their intentions to 
the Navy in financial terms based on the desired contract length. The lowest 
bidders from each auction will be awarded a contract for the respective 
timeframe with an annual bonus in the amount of the first non-winning bid.  
Application of this format does not ensure that short-term contracts will award 
bonuses that are less than long-term contracts, as is currently the case.  
However, all candidates know that bonus amounts are set by competition with 
their peers with consideration of private sector alternatives.   
With an eye towards future personnel inventory requirements, Navy 
policy-makers can determine what fraction of contracts will be awarded to each 
contract length.  The Navy may chose to disclose this information prior to an 
auction or after bidding is completed.  If this information is available to bidders, it 
could reveal the competitiveness of a particular contract or lack thereof, resulting 
in changes in behavior by the prospective officers.  In addition, based on the 
bidding outcome for each contract length, the Navy can select an appropriate 
quantity of each to offer, even to the point where no one is selected for a 
particular contract is offered if bids are excessive.     
Auctions should be conducted annually over a predetermined timeframe 
(e.g. one month), to allow all participants the timely submission of bids with 
regard to individual operational requirements.  Each auction must be competitive 
between members of their respective warfare communities.  For example, it 
would be inappropriate for prospective Commanding Officers to compete for 
bonus amounts with Junior Officers who have just completed their initial Active 
Duty Service Obligation.  Each of these officers has different responsibilities 




Accordingly, auctions should be conducted among peer groups, such as Junior 
Officers, Department Heads, etc.  In so doing, the Navy promotes adequate 
competition within each group while capturing the appropriate level of 
competition with the private sector.            
 
2. Conditions 
Like current bonus plans, prospective officers must certainly meet 
predetermined eligibility conditions.  As discussed, positive endorsements by 
one’s Commanding Officer along with minimum performance requirements as 
measured by Fitness Reports are essential components of an effective personnel 
continuation policy.  Through the continued use of this screening mechanism, the 
Navy will ensure that all prospective officers possess the skills necessary for 
continued service in their respective warfare communities.  
Additionally, participation in the proposed bonus program must be 
considered binding.  Whichever contract length the bidding officer wins, must be 
a commitment to accept that contract and remain on active duty for the requisite 
number of years.  By requiring the winners to accept the winning bid, the Navy 
ensures that officers will bid their honest value for each contract.  Over-bidding 
may result in involuntary separation, whereas underbidding would potentially 
lower the winning amount, but winners will still receive a surplus since the bonus 
amount will be greater than all of the winners’ bids.    
The contract could also require the officer to achieve a promotion during 
the time of the contract as appropriate and/or qualify for the next senior position 
such as Executive or Commanding Officer.  By incorporating such a stipulation, 
the Navy gives incentive to the officer for continued success and investment in 
one’s own human capital.  Failure to do so could result in officers failing to 
promote or screen for their next assignment, and thereby having to separate and 
forfeit future bonus installments. 
It is entirely possible that an officer could be in the winning party of both 




since an officer cannot take part in multiple contracts.  To resolve such an event, 
individuals winning both auctions will be allowed to choose which contract they 
prefer, ex post.  This decision will likely be based on the surplus received from 
each bid and the individual’s tolerance for risk versus job security.  Allowing 
individuals to choose how they would like to resolve the issue would likely 
increase the program’s efficacy.   
Lastly, the contracts signed by winning bidders must be binding, and not 
transferable or renegotiable.  Officers serving under one contract would not be 
eligible to take part in the annual auctions hoping to increase their surplus.  To 
allow officer to do so removes the flexibility component of this program, and 
reverts to the similar activity under current policy whereby officers can sign new 
contracts each year as the annual bonus amounts increase.                     
 
 
C. EXPECTED RESULTS 
 
1. Short-term Results 
Implementation of such a bonus program will certainly be met with some 
resistance and reveal other opportunities for improvement.  However, the 
potential gains in skill level and flexibility are vital to the continued modernization 
of the Navy’s personnel total compensation system.  Fostering competition for 
annual bonuses among peer groups ensures that all participants place their bids 
based on their true value of the bonus.  Risking separation for bidding too high is 
a large price to pay for someone who wants to continue in Naval service.  
Additionally, the ongoing risk of continued auctions and fluctuating bonuses helps 
to promote more competition for longer-term contracts, thereby revealing the 
private value of bonuses.  However, since this proposal calls for a second-price 
auction, each winning bidder is guaranteed to receive a bonus that is larger than 
his or her bid, contributing to individual satisfaction while further enticing 




                                           
Over the first few periods in place, it is possible that there will be little 
variation in bonus amounts from current programs as a result of the concept of 
anchoring.  Simply stated, anchoring is “clinging to a fact or figure that should 
have no bearing on your judgments or decisions.”17  Since this program would be 
so new and unlike any other program implemented in the Navy, participants 
could easily default to an amount that they are comfortable or familiar with.  
Since bonus amounts tend to remain flat or increase over time, individuals are 
likely to anchor to current levels at first.  Even over multiple periods, the same 
phenomenon could occur as a result of confirmation bias.  Confirmation bias 
“consists of a tendency to search for, treat kindly, and be overly impressed by 
information that confirms…initial impressions or preferences.”18  For instance, if 
the first bonus auctions occur and bidders do not vary significantly from current 
levels resulting in a similar bonus amount, that level may be confirmed in the 
minds of participants and future participants.  However, over time, as fluctuations 
occur, bidders’ true valuations will emerge. 
As with any new program, participants will have to become familiar with 
the process and rules that are implemented.  Similarly, detailers and others 
providing guidance must also be very familiar with the process.  Therefore, 
significant information must be made available to each officer to ensure thorough 
understanding of the concept of reverse, second-price auctions.  Many are 
familiar with the English Auctions that are conducted on websites like E-Bay or at 
auction houses, but are less familiar with this type of proposed auction.  The 
recommended format and the idea of lower bids having an increased likelihood of 
success can confuse bidders unfamiliar with the concept.  A suggested piece of 
information might include a Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) newsletter 
containing likely questions such as: “Why is it better to bid my true value?” or 
“What are the risks of bidding too high?”  Another tool for clarification could 
 
17 Gary Belsky and Thomas Gilovich, Why Smart People Make Big Money Mistakes and How to 
Correct Them: Lessons From the New Science of Behavioral Economics (New York, NY: Fireside). 
18 Gary Belsky and Thomas Gilovich, Why Smart People Make Big Money Mistakes and How to 




include a website simulator allowing the participants to take part in mock auctions 
to see the results.           
 
2. Long-term Effects 
In the long run, this type of bonus program has great potential.  While 
certainly some of the potential pitfalls described above can occur in the short 
term, once they are corrected, the Navy Officer bonus program can be a 
dynamic, flexible plan for officers and the Navy.  After a few periods of bidding, 
members are likely to consider the process routine, and simple.  As some 
members hold reservation wages above the winning bonus amounts and are not 
selected for continued service, others will receive a bonus in excess of their bid.  
This will have the effect of driving bids down.  Having lower bonuses will not have 
a dramatic effect on overall quality of life for officers, since each of the other 
forms of compensation outlined in chapter II would still be in place. 
 
3. Conclusion and Recommendations for Further Study 
Currently, bonus programs offered to officers are static plans, increasing 
periodically as a result of retention or force-shaping needs.  Bonus amounts 
rarely, if ever, decline in nominal terms making it appear to servicemembers that 
it is only another part of ordinary pay.  Such a system does not allow individual 
officers to signal their intentions or willingness to continue service.  Establishing a 
program whereby officers can signal their long-term intentions can provide the 
Navy with more forward-looking information.   
As it stands now, shorter bonus contracts provide less monetary incentive 
then those of a longer-term.  This has the effect of driving out those officers who 
may be highly skilled and therefore require a larger monetary incentive to 
continue service.  If such an officer is reluctant to commit to a long-term contract, 
he will be more reluctant to commit to a short-term contract for fewer dollars.  By 
offering a tiered system, that allows both short-term and long-term contract 




the longer-term contract bonus, the Navy can improve its underlying officer skill 
set by attracting the higher skilled officers.   
In order to determine the proper values for each contract length, a second-
price, sealed bid auction is proposed.  Such a program would ensure that officers 
bid based on current economic conditions in the overall job market.  Competing 
bids will help constrain bonus payments.  It is likely that longer-term contract 
bonuses would be less than shorter-term contract bonuses because of the 
security and avoidance of risk that they provide.  By selecting the desired ratio of 
short-term to long-term contracts, the Navy gains access to a valuable force-
shaping tool.  During times of downsizing, more short-term contracts can be 
awarded.  Alternatively, during times where high rates of retention are desired 
into the foreseeable future, longer-term contracts can be favored.  In either case, 
the Navy can be sure that the bonus amounts are the proper amounts, since the 
job market participants themselves will have set them. 
Further study and research will only lead to improvements in this area.  
While this thesis addresses the program from an academic and theoretical 
perspective, the use of experiments would provide real data for analysis.  Groups 
of officers from various warfare communities could take part in controlled 
experiments on a variety of different ways to conduct such an auction.  A 
valuable outcome of these experiments could be bidding strategy data based on 
what information is provided to the bidders.  For instance, if the Navy makes 
known the exact number of officers to be retained, or what ratio of long and 
short-term contracts will be chosen, bidders’ behavior will likely change.  If the 
Navy’s reserve price is made available (the most they are willing to pay the 
winning bidders), officers are likely to change their behavior.  Other valuable 
information can be gained as well through continued research in this area.  The 
results of smaller test groups can then be applied to a larger segment of the 
Navy officer community.   
Analyzing future studies can provide the Navy with insight into such a 




expected and outlined in this thesis, the Navy can choose not to implement this 
alternative approach.  However, if cost savings can be realized, as predicted, the 
Navy will have at its disposal another force-shaping tool.  In the end, the goal is 
to provide the Navy with a flexible, effective officer bonus program that is 
responsive to the current job market conditions.  As private sector compensation 
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